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The Influence of Information Power Upon the Great Game in
Cyberspace: U.S. Wins over Russian Meddling in the 2018 Elections1
Joseph H. Schafer

Abstract
The 2018 U.S. pivot in information2 and cyberspace3 degraded Russian operations in the 2018
election. Following pervasive Russian information power4 operations during the U.S. 2016
elections, the United States progressed from a policy of preparations and defense in information
and cyberspace5 to a policy of forward engagement. U.S recognition of renewed great power
competition coupled with Russia’s inability to compete diplomatically, militarily (conventionally),
or economically, inspires Russia to continues to concentrate on information power operations.
This great game in cyberspace was virtually uncontested by the U.S. prior to 2017. Widespread
awareness of Russian aggression in 2016 served as a catalyst which highlighted the enormity of
Russian campaigns and the crippling constraints on U.S. information power. This catalyst pivoted
the U.S. from a passive policy of preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a
policy of forward engagement that successfully attenuated Russian efforts in 2018.
By examining information power from theory development and Russian practice to recent
reports and primary sources we find that the U.S. demonstrated the capability and willingness to
defend forward successfully during the 2018 elections. Going forward, the U.S. must continue
and expand efforts to contest cyberspace and counter disinformation to secure our democracy and
the U.S. 2020 presidential election.

Introduction
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Intelligence Estimate Chairman wrote to the
CIA director, ‘This year’, Moscow has ‘made it plain that there are sharp distinctions between the
contending parties and policies’ and that the Kremlin has made ‘their preference’ known. The year
was 1964. The Democratic candidate, Lyndon Johnson trounced his Republican opponent, Barry
Goldwater overwhelmingly, as the Soviets had hoped. Twenty years later the CIA director was
again warned and the Soviets ‘unleashed the KGB’s propaganda arm to paint Reagan as a militarist
and warmonger, popularizing the slogan, ‘Reagan Means War!” This information power
campaign proved ineffectual as the Republican Ronald Reagan crushed the Democratic Walter
Mondale in the 1984 election.6
The Soviets and the Russians have been attempting to influence7 democratic elections in the
U.S. and around the world for many, many years. More recently, following widespread Russian
information power operations during the U.S. 2016 elections, the U.S. pivoted from a policy of
preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward engagement. U.S
recognition of renewed great power competition coupled with Russia’s inability to compete
diplomatically, militarily (conventionally), or economically, inspires Russia to continues to
concentrate on information power operations. This great game in cyberspace was virtually
uncontested by the U.S. prior to 2017. Widespread awareness of Russian efforts in 2016 served
as a catalyst which highlighted the enormity of Russian campaigns and the crippling constraints
on U.S. Information power. This catalyst pivoted the U.S. from a passive policy of preparations
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and defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward engagement that successfully
attenuated Russian efforts in 2018.
By examining information power from theory development and Russian practice to recent
reports and primary sources we find that the U.S. demonstrated the capability and willingness to
defend forward successfully during the 2018 elections. Going forward, the U.S. must continue
and expand efforts to contest cyberspace and counter disinformation to secure our democracy and
the U.S. 2020 presidential election.

Information Power Theory
The pivot represents a U.S. shift in policy and practice in the long-running debates on the
nature and influences of information power. In many cultures and epochs, multidisciplinary
practitioners and scholars have debated information power. 19th Century strategist and Prussian
General Carl von Clausewitz wrote that “War . . . is an act of violence to compel our opponent to
fulfill our will.”8 U.S military doctrine defines Informational Power as “the ability to affect
behavior through the use of information.”9 The supremacy of information power has been
acknowledged for centuries. Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist, wrote 2,500 years ago, “To fight and
conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy’s resistance without fighting.”10 An adversary’s will is fulfilled without fighting, the
enemy’s resistance is broken, and their behavior affected by the power of information.
A near contemporary of Sun Tzu, Socrates lamented the development of writing which would
provide information without proper instruction. The arrival of Gutenberg’s printing press 2,000
years later spurred fears of intellectual laziness that would undermine authority. Many fears
proved true and authorities were undermined, but the benefits of these informational technologies
proved far more profound.11 Ongoing concerns today about emerging technologies12 highlight our
continued tendency to both expect the best and the worst from information inventions.

Protecting and Defining Information power
The U.S. has recognized Information as an instrument of national power in the DIME
construct (Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economics) for many years13. The U.S. has even
recognized the need to protect information since 1775 when it established, in the Postal Service,
the worlds’ first government organization tasked with protecting citizen information.14 Today’s
changes include multi-gigabit connectivity that is more than 300 million times faster than the
telegraph and 30 billion times faster than the Pony Express.15
However, the U.S. has been slow to embrace the hybrid nature of information power
particularly in response to population manipulation.16 Researchers and practitioners have
protested that information power is indispensable and yet has not garnered the attention of U.S.
national security strategists, 17 until recently. From a theoretical perspective Claude Shannon’s
1948 seminal information theory paper proved that information is a well-defined, measurable
quantity18 that can be treated like mass or energy19 rather than an undefinable ether.20 These laws
physical laws establish the boundaries of information power. Politics shape cyberspace, as with
writing and printing, as they shape land, sea, air, and space.21 These boundaries are expanding as
the vanishing cost the multiplying speed and reach of information power generates great promise
and great vulnerability.
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Recognizing these vulnerabilities, state and non-state actors have been using information
power, just as they would use more traditional powers and technologies to gain advantages. The
U.S. military characterizes Information Operations (IO) as the integrated employment of
information and cyberspace capabilities22, “to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision
making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”23
In addition to IO, the United States has used many phrases to describe the intersecting and
overlapping concepts including Electronic, Information, Influence, Psychological, and Cyber
Warfare. Despite doctrine for broader information operations, the U.S. paradigm of information
power has concentrated on the information technology, telecommunications, and cyber
infrastructure24 even when the influence components have proven dominant. The information age
remains unevenly distributed and the authority of states remain relevant. From the strategic
perspective, the new synthetic domain of warfare is Cyberspace and the overarching phrase for
national and military effects in information and cyberspace is Information Power.

Hard Power, Soft Power and Sharp Information power
A spectrum of power from coercive “Hard Power” to persuasive “Soft Power”25 may describe
all the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power.”26
Hard and soft power can be applied by states for good or bad ends; soft power simply requires
attractive and voluntary means.27 Misleadingly, soft power has been used to describe all forms of
influence and information power that are not hard military force. However, we observe many
instantiations of influence which are not persuasive and this type of hard power that uses deceptive
information for hostile ends is called “Sharp Power” to distinguish it from attractive soft power.28
By design, distinguishing deceptive sharp power propaganda from open persuasive soft power can
prove very difficult for nations and people. Much of the great game in cyberspace is played with
sharp power.

The Great Game in Cyberspace
The “Great Game” refers to a 19th century period of competition between the British and
Russian Empires in the 19th over influence in the Afghanistan region29. The Great Game primarily
describes British responses to perceived Russian threats during this period of unclear motives,
mistrust, intrigue, and malign influence30. The end of Cold War (1957-1991) period of competition
between Soviet Union and the U.S. planted the seeds of renewed great power completion due to
the economic, political, and alliance disruptions. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote
in 2014 that, “No Russian was more angered by this turn of events than [Russian President]
Vladimir Putin, who would later say that the end of the Soviet Union was the worst geopolitical
event of the twentieth century.”31 A primary outlet for this anger is cyberspace.

Renewed Great Power Competition
Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark Esper has reiterated the observations of his predecessor32,
General Jim Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), who wrote in the U.S. 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS), “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of longterm, strategic competition by what [President Trump’s 2017] National Security Strategy classifies
as revisionist powers.”33 Regarding Russia, Esper explicitly stated during his confirmation hearing
on July 16, 2019, that we, “have entered a new era of great-power competition.”34
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“The Great Game in Cyberspace,” coined here, is an apt if imperfect description of the current
information power struggle below the level of kinetic armed military conflict with competitors
including Russia. Although competitors have been spreading disinformation for millennia; a
challenge in cyberspace is that attacks and their attribution can be more nuanced and more political
than has been widely understood.35 Though the attribution obstacles are diminishing, nowhere is
the effect of these developments more far-reaching than on state sponsored information power
operations.36

Wartime and Peacetime in Cyberspace
Democracies tend to draw sharp distinctions between the conditions and authorities of
peacetime and wartime. Authoritarian regimes, less so, such that they develop integrated
capabilities that operate across the conditions of international relationships.”37 However, despite
actions and assertions to the contrary, aggression, even via information power in cyberspace, are
not the normative behaviors of law-abiding nations.
From 2009 until 2012 law-abiding nations organized by NATO convened an international
group of experts to document norms for operations in information and cyberspace. They published
the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, in 2013, 38
documenting relevant legal regimes in the cyber context. The focus was on cyber warfare “armed
attacks” which allow states to respond in self-defense. A second and more diverse group of experts
published Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations in 2017,
which adds topics reflecting the reality of daily information and cyberspace “operations” that do
not rise to the level of armed conflict.39 Both manuals reflect "the law as it exists" according to
international experts and describe the legal limits for operations in information and cyberspace.40
Since applicable international law remains unacknowledged by competitors, the game of great
power competition has increasingly been played out in information and cyberspace. Russia
increasingly engages in asymmetric attacks in information and cyberspace because the U.S. has
far superior diplomatic, economic, and conventional military power.41 U.S. recognition of
renewed great power competition coupled with Russia’s inability to compete diplomatically,
militarily (conventionally), or economically, inspires Russia to continues to concentrate on
information power operations.

Russian Information Power Operations
“Foreign politicians talk about Russia’s interference in elections and referendums
around the world. In fact, the matter is even more serious: Russia interferes in your
brains, we change your conscience, and there is nothing you can do about it.”
– Vladislav Surkov, Adviser to Russian president Vladimir Putin42
The 2011 Russian Information Space Activities Concept states that Information War is the
confrontation between states in the information space to 1) damage information systems,
resources, and critical infrastructure, 2) undermine the political, economic and social systems, 3)
massively manipulate populations to destabilize the state and society, and 4) coerce the states to
make decisions for the benefit Russia.43
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Russia has proven particularly adept and active in manipulating information and cyberspace.
“Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”44 It is often chaotic and
dizzying.45 Clausewitz reminds us that in contests between states, the political object is the ends
or the goal, “war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from
their purpose.”46 Russian doctrine toward the means and ends of information power has focused
on this asymmetric and hybrid approach. Through this hybrid warfare, Russia seeks to impose its
will without crossing the threshold of armed conflict. “This insidious form of aggression includes
military elements such as intelligence, cyber-attacks and fake news, as well as the firing of riots
and terrorism. ... They are thus putting democracies at risk.”47
Former Defense Secretary Mattis wrote in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy that: “Russia has
used cyber-enabled information operations to influence our population and challenge our
democratic processes.”48 The means of this campaign “include the use of deception, deflection of
responsibility, outright lies, and the creation of an alternative reality.” 49 Defense Secretary Esper
recently stated that Russia has pursued and developed a very adept asymmetric capability in the
realm of Information Warfare “because of the strength of our conventional forces.”50

Russian Sharp Power
The current Russian approach to sharp power propaganda builds upon Soviet experiences and
successes with obfuscation and motivating target actions without them realizing. However, it now
leverages the evolving information environment in way unimaginable to their Soviet predecessors.
This new Russian model has been called the “Firehose of Falsehood” because they rapidly and
continuously leverage an enormous number of communications channels with a “shameless
willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fiction.”51
The greatest successes of Soviet meddling or political warfare came from “fellow travelers
whose agendas paralleled the Soviets’ and who needed little if any coordination.”52
Researchers have identified two waves of Russian meddling over the past twenty years. The
first wave from demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s until 2014 targeted only post-Soviet
countries. Since then, a second wave has expanded dramatically into established Western
democracies including the recent French presidential elections, the Spanish Catalan independence
poll, and the UK’s BREXIT referendum, to cite a very few. “However, an examination of both of
these waves shows that Russia’s efforts have made little difference.”53
Since 2014, researchers have provided empirical evidence on how Russia has moved towards
a preference for Soviet-style active measures which blur of boundaries between public diplomacy,
forgeries, disinformation, military threats, spys, and agents of influence. These sharp power active
measures highlight Russian foreign policy strategy including goals for marginalizing NATO and
democratic institutions around the world.54

Russian 2016 Election Interference and Workflow
Different in 2016 was the Russian intelligence success in influencing democratic elections
and referenda by combining the traditional intelligence disciplines such as disinformation with
cutting edge cyber tactics to create a hybrid intelligence, reminiscent of Soviet ‘complex active
measures’55 Russia did not need to employ hard cyber-attacks such as hacking into voting
machines, instead, the goals appear to have been to create mistrust about election results.56 Despite
vulnerabilities, “no allegations of altered vote tallies have surfaced, suggesting that the American
people did get their intended result.”57
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Special Counsel, Robert Mueller’s Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In
The 2016 Presidential Election, recapping a two year investigation, states that the Russian
government backed “Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out … a social media campaign
designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States.”58 Indeed, the
specified Russian goals of exacerbating American social polarization, continue mushrooming.
The Russian Internet Research Agency spent months creating fake American local news
outlets; most stories were crafted to stir chaos and disgust towards candidates and issues. 59 The
steps of the Russian fake news propaganda workflow include: 1. Create (or warp) an outrageous
story. 2. Amplify the story in the traditional and social media. 3. Validate the story (i.e. with
Russian leadership commentary) 4. Magnify the validated story with additional social buzz and
shares 5. Propaganda are taken as fact by many people.60 Fake news is one of the greatest threats
to democracy, journalism, and economies because it has weakened public trust in governments
and the institutions of democracy.61
In his opening statement, Mark Warner, Vice-Chair of the Senate Select Committee on
intelligence noted the power of information operations in a networked world: “Russians have been
conducting information warfare for decades. But what is new is the advent of social media tools
with the power to magnify propaganda and fake news on a scale that was unimaginable back in
the days of the Berlin Wall.62
Russia’s broad social media presence can appear random. Indeed, all sides of polarizing issues
have asserted that Russia is helping their opposition. However, the New York Times reports that
Russia’s information and cyberspace influence campaigns target content and audiences “cross all
ideological boundaries.”63 Russian agents amplify divisive and emotionally outrageous messaging
on all sides of any given issue, so much so that it sometimes appears as though the sole purpose of
a disinformation operation is to sow general chaos in the targeted society.64
Emotionally outrageous fake news stories are 70% more likely to be retweeted and more
rapidly. Because fake news is more sensational, it propagates further and faster than real news. 65
The reach of fake news was highlighted during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign. The
top twenty fake election stories generated 8.7 million reactions comments on Facebook. Ironically,
the top twenty election stories from major news websites generated only 7.4 million reactions.66
In late 2017, Facebook, Twitter, and Alphabet (Google) each provided enormous IRA data
sets to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Experts analyzed these text,
images, videos, and other content data sets.67 The magnitude of the IRA activities was immense,
fueled by troll farms and fake news68 — ”reaching 126 million people on Facebook, posting 10.4
million tweets on Twitter, uploading 1,000+ videos to YouTube, and reaching over 20 million
users on Instagram.”69 All intended to incite divisions in the U.S. electorate.

Black and Blue Lives: Russians Plan Both Sides
The Russian Internet Research Agency pursued “important internal problems” in the U.S. by
creating a “media mirage” of social media pages and accounts within the target community70.
African Americans were relentlessly targeted. According to Senate Intelligence Committee
reports, an individual that followed a single IRA account, “would have been exposed to content
from dozens more, as well as carefully-curated authentic Black media content that was
ideologically or thematically aligned.”71

6

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol4/iss2/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.4.2.1076

6

Schafer: The Influence of Information Power Upon the Great Game

For instance, #BlackLivesMatter is an authentic movement. Russians duped citizens with
inauthentic Twitter and Facebook accounts to inflame opinions about police shootings to reinforce
a narrative that the justice system was deeply racist.72 Seeking to further incite divisions, the
Russians hijacked the murder of five police officers on July 7 2016 and exploded the divide by
viralizing the counter-movement, #BlueLivesMatter.73 The IRA’s inauthentic communities on
both sides “pulled users into a virtual vortex; ... doubly dangerous because the content was often
based on kernels of truth.”74 Playing both sides, Russia aggressively propagandized citizens so
that advocating or criticizing police officers became politicized.75

Russian Goals
“Russian efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election represent the most
recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal
democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in
directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations.76
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), January 6, 2017
Broader than simply inciting divisions in the U.S. electorate, weakening the Western global
order is a primary Russian strategy directly inherited from the Cold War Soviets. Russia intensifies
hyperpartisanship and extreme movements. Russia relies heavily on information and cyberspace
attacks on the U.S. and NATO allies to stoke divisions and undercut confidence in politics and
civil society.77
Director Clapper’s report goes on to say that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered
information power campaign against the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Russia’s goals were to
undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process and denigrate Secretary Clinton.78 Putin
has publicly blamed Clinton since 2011 for inciting protests against his regime at that time for
disparaging comments she made against him.79 Many researchers agree that Hillary Clinton’s
“criticism of Putin infuriated him and served as a key motivator for the Kremlin’s meddling in the
U.S. election of 2016.”80
In addition to police issues, substantial content was Pro-Sanders, Pro-Trump, and AntiClinton. The IRA targeted many major divides including fake communities that supported and
opposed Christians, Muslims, LGBT, feminists, immigrants, and refugees.81 These Russian
information and cyberspace sharp power attacks hamper civil discourse because they degrade
rather than persuade across the spectrum of shared and political common-knowledge.82
In May 2017, Former CIA and National Security Agency director General Michael Hayden
described Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election as “the most successful covert
influence campaign in history”83 A month later, now former DNI Clapper summed up goals and
effects in Senate testimony, The Russians “must be congratulating themselves for having exceeded
their wildest expectations with a minimal expenditure of resources’.84 This great game in
cyberspace was virtually uncontested by the U.S. prior to 2017.

U.S. Information and Cyberspace Policy History and 2018 Pivot
Following pervasive Russian information power operations during the U.S. 2016 elections,
the U.S. progressed from a policy of preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a
7
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policy of forward engagement. Widespread awareness of Russian aggression in 2016 served as a
catalyst which highlighted the enormity of Russian campaigns and the crippling constraints on
U.S. Information power. This catalyst pivoted the U.S. from a passive policy of preparations and
defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward. This blatant meddling in 2016
spurred U.S. preparations and policies that successfully attenuated Russian aggression in 2018.

Early U.S. Information and Cyberspace Policy
In February 2003, three months after consolidating 22 U.S. agencies into the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), President George W. Bush released the first U.S. National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace.
U.S. Department of Defense information and cyberspace organizations continued to mature
during this period through a number of Joint Task Forces aligned with the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) culminating with the creation
of the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as a subunified command of the U.S. Strategic
Command in 2009.85

Policies Prior to the U.S. 2016 Elections
General Keith Alexander, nominated in 2010 by President Barack Obama as the first
commander of the new U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), stated during his confirmation
hearing that there was a “mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and
the governing laws and policies.”86 USCYBERCOM continued its initial focus on technical
capabilities, defense, and response.
In May 2011, President Barack Obama’s “International Strategy for Cyberspace” stated:
“When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any
other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize
that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the
commitments we have with our military treaty partners. … —as appropriate and consistent with
applicable international law, … we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we
can;… seeking broad international support whenever possible.”87 Russia was not mentioned at
all.
The Strategic Goals of the Obama Administration’s 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy describes
defending DoD missions and U.S. interests.88 “The United States will continue to respond to
cyberattacks against U.S. interests at a time, in a manner, and in a place of our choosing, using
appropriate instruments of U.S. power and in accordance with applicable law.”89 Noting that
“Russian actors are stealthy in their cyber tradecraft and their intentions are sometimes difficult to
discern.”90
In May 2017, USCYBERCOM Commander Admiral Mike Rogers submitted testimony to the
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on
the “Cyber Threat Environment.” 25% of the eleven page assessment was devoted to ISIS terrorist
influence campaigns and much of the remaining described threats to information systems.91 A
single sentence to mentions concern for “states seeking to shape the policies and attitudes of
democratic peoples” again with no mention of Russian influence campaigns.92
As with nuclear weapons, President Obama had sole authority to authorize the use of
cyberweapons in recognition that they could can have mass destruction effects.93 However,
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deterrence in cyberspace is much different than nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence total
prevention due to fears of mutually assured destruction. In contrast, information and cyber effects
are continuous.94
Aside from failing to acknowledge the Russian aggression in information and cyberspace, the
most challenging problem for Obama – as expressed by “Democrats and Republicans with vast
experience in national security” is his “micromanagement of the Pentagon and Intelligence
Community by a bloated and lackluster National Security Council.” In fact, after leaving the
Pentagon, “Obama’s first three secretaries of Defense — Robert M. Gates, Leon E. Panetta and
Chuck Hagel — accused the Obama White House of micromanaging the military.”95

Policy Pivot Prior to the 2018 Election
Frustration with the unremitting defeats in information and cyberspace drove a series of
bipartisan legislative and executive remedies. In a dramatic shift, President Donald Trump’s 2017
National Security Strategy96 labels Russia’s actions in cyberspace as “destabilizing” and asserts
that Russia “uses information operations as part of its offensive cyber efforts to influence public
opinion across the globe. Through modernized forms of subversive tactics, Russia interferes in
the domestic political affairs of countries around the world.”97
The U.S. military emphasis on information and cyberspace has soared in the past few months
with 1) the recognition that Cyberspace is the fifth domain of warfare (alongside Land, Sea, Air,
and Space), 2) the promotion of the U.S. Cyber Command to Combatant Command status, and 3)
most recently the elevation of Information as the seventh joint function (The Joint Functions are:
C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information.).98
Defense Secretary James Mattis endorsed the introduction of Information as a new, seventh
joint function signaling99 “a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels within today's complex operating environment.”100
Additionally, the Defense Authorization Act of 2017, re-designated the National Defens
University’s Information and Resource Management College (IRMC) as the College of
Information and cyberspace (CIC).101 And on 4 May 2018 the U.S. Cyber Command was elevated
to Unified Combatant Command status, raising its stature as a direct report to the Secretary of
Defense. The elevation reinforces the importance of information and cyberspace, reassure allies,
deters adversaries, and streamlines control of time sensitive operations.102
President Trump’s 2018 National Cyber Strategy asserts that “The United States will use all
appropriate tools of national power to expose and counter the flood of online malign influence and
information campaigns and non-state propaganda and disinformation.”103
The 2018 National Defense Strategy goes on to emphasize that Russia is competing across all
dimensions of power and seeks to shatter NATO and to shape an authoritarian world with control
over other nations’ structures and decisions. Specifically, Russia has “increased efforts short of
armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting
ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.”104
Secretary Mattis further asserts in the 2018 U.S. Defense Cyber Strategy that “Russia has used
cyber-enabled information operations to influence our population and challenge our democratic
processes. … We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source,
including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.”105 The 2018 cyberspace objectives
include ensuring the US military can achieve objectives contested cyberspace, conducting cyber
9
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operations to enhance U.S. military advantages, defending U.S. and DoD (including civilian assets
that enable military advantage) from cyber-attacks that could be significant, and expanding
cooperation with interagency, industry, and international partners.106
In September 2018 President Trump signed Executive Order 13848 enabling sanctions for
foreign interference that attempts to “influence, undermine confidence in, or alter the result or
reported result” of an election or “undermine public confidence in election processes or
institutions.”107
The 2016 election interference catalyst pivoted the U.S. from the passive policy of defense in
information and cyberspace to a policy of engagement to defend forward for the 2018 elections.
These changes were lauded by many, across the political spectrum, such as Democratic
Congressmen James Langevin, Co-Chair of the House Cybersecurity Caucus, who spoke of
bipartisan support for the new approach during a keynote address in Washington.108 However,
this more active posture was met with substantial criticism as well including media assertions such
as: “Under the Trump administration, the traditional structure of White House oversight of
American offensive and defensive cyber activities is being dismantled.”109

USCYBERCOM Defending Forward
Russia has used cyber-enabled information operations to influence our population
and challenge our democratic processes. … USCYBERCOM has recently improved
the scope, speed, and effectiveness of its operations with the help of legal and policy
changes.110
USCYBERCOM Commander and NSA Director, General Paul Nakasone
Testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee
These changes in policy from response to persistent engagement aligned USCYBERCOM
with the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy which each
highlight the return of great power competition – particularly as it is shifted towards cyberspace
and below the level of armed conflict.111
General Nakasone, the Commander of USCYBERCOM and the Director of the National
Security Agency explained in a recent interview that, we must keep in mind four foundations
concepts in cyberspace: 1) we are in constant contact with adversaries, 2) our security is
challenged, 3) superiority is ephemeral, and 4) advantage favors initiative. Thus, the cyber domain
is one of constant action to defend actively, to conduct reconnaissance, to understand capabilities
and intent, and to improve quickly.112
In a recent article, General Nakasone elaborates: “We must “defend forward” in cyberspace,
as we do in the physical domains. Our naval forces do not defend by staying in port, and our
airpower does not remain at airfields. They patrol the seas and skies to ensure they are positioned
to defend our country before our borders are crossed. The same logic applies in cyberspace.”113
We cannot succeed if we stay inside our own networks. “Shifting from a response outlook to a
persistence force that defends forward moves our cyber capabilities out of their virtual garrisons,
adopting a posture that matches the cyberspace operational environment.”114
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USCYBERCOM’s Number One Priority in 2018
“Ensuring a safe and secure election was our No. 1 priority,
and drove me to establish a joint U.S. Cyber Command/NSA
effort we called the Russia Small Group.”115
USCYBERCOM Commander and NSA Director, General Paul Nakasone
Testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee
General Nakasone went on to tell lawmakers that protecting the 2018 midterms from meddling
adversaries was both a priority and a challenge. “In the last 10 years, our adversaries have been
operating below the threshold of armed conflict, stealing our intellectual property, leveraging our
personally identifiable information, or attempting to influence our elections.” This is why
USCYBERCOM “evolved its strategic concept and operational approach from a response force to
a persistence force.”116
Defense Secretary Esper expounded on the final enabling order during his confirmation
hearing. Secretary Esper credited the 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)
13 as being just as important as our great capabilities because is allowed our cyber forces to “lean
forward” into a more offensive posture. NSPM-13 replaced the previous process which required
presidential approval for cyber operations. The new policy allows the president to delegate
authorities. Esper credited NSPM-13 with unleashing the great capability of U.S. Cyber Command
to secure the 2018 elections.117
Again, with this approach, comes risks. Media reported that, “The Pentagon has quietly
empowered the United States Cyber Command to take a far more aggressive approach to defending
the nation against cyberattacks, a shift in strategy that could increase the risk of conflict with the
foreign states that sponsor malicious hacking groups.” 118

U.S. Information Power Results and Implications
By examining information power from theory development and Russian practice to recent
reports and primary sources we find that the U.S. demonstrated the capability and willingness to
defend forward successfully during the 2018 elections.
USCYBERCOM struck the Russian Internet Research Agency during the 2018 midterms took
them offline as part of “the first offensive cyber campaign against Russia designed to thwart
attempts to interfere with a U.S. election.” 119 This was the first operation by USCYBERCOM,
“with intelligence from the National Security Agency, under new authorities it was granted by
President Donald Trump and Congress last year to bolster offensive capabilities.”120
Despite our success during the 2018 elections, the mission of defending our nation in
information and cyberspace remains “one of the least developed mission areas and one in which
there is little consensus on what it means to defend the nation and its interests in cyberspace, or on
what role the Department of Defense should be for this mission.”121
Secretary Esper further stated during his confirmation hearing that, “We are at war in the cyber
domain now battling countries like Russia and China who are doing everything from stealing
technology to influencing elections to putting out disinformation about the United States.”122
Having demonstrated the capability and willingness to defend forward, the U.S. must continue,
11
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clarify, and expand efforts to contest cyberspace and counter disinformation to secure our
democracy and the U.S. 2020 presidential election.
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